Mapping the Law of Legalizing Maps: The Implications of the Emerging Rule on Map Evidence in International Law by Lee, Hyung K.
Washington International Law Journal 
Volume 14 Number 1 
1-1-2005 
Mapping the Law of Legalizing Maps: The Implications of the 
Emerging Rule on Map Evidence in International Law 
Hyung K. Lee 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj 
 Part of the International Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Hyung K. Lee, Comment, Mapping the Law of Legalizing Maps: The Implications of the Emerging Rule on 
Map Evidence in International Law, 14 Pac. Rim L & Pol'y J. 159 (2005). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj/vol14/iss1/7 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington International Law Journal by an authorized editor of UW 
Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
Copyright © 2005 Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal Association
MAPPING THE LAW OF LEGALIZING MAPS: THE
IMPLICATIONS OF THE EMERGING RULE ON MAP
EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
Hyung K. Leet
Abstract: Parties to boundary and territory disputes often rely on maps favorable
to their claims. Traditional international law, however, restricts the evidentiary value of
maps so that they provide only collateral, rather than probative evidence of title.
Although international tribunals have not yet abrogated the traditional rule on map
evidence, their recent decisions show willingness to depart from it in certain
circumstances. The emerging new rule on map evidence poses intriguing theoretical as
well as practical questions. This Comment analyzes several decisions of the International
Court of Justice and the Permanent Court of Arbitration to reveal the evolution in the
status of map evidence in contemporary customary international law. These decisions
show that today's tribunals bestow more evidentiary value on maps than ever before.
The emerging new rule on map evidence may better conform to the domestic practice of
states in dealing with map evidence as demonstrated by the examples of Australia and the
United States. Finally, by applying the emerging rule to two territorial disputes in the
Pacific Rim region-the Russo-Japanese dispute over the Southern Kuril islands, and the
Korean-Japanese dispute over Dokdo island-we can surmise how it may influence the
resolution of the thorny territorial problems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Maps often play a pivotal role in international boundary or territory
disputes. Parties to a territory or boundary dispute often rely heavily on map
evidence to prove their title over the disputed area or a particular line as the
boundary.1 The subject of such territory or boundary conflicts is usually
disposition of land--often island territories-which may have enormous
impacts on the lives of ordinary people. For example, if a country loses its
title over an island, numerous fishermen could lose their fishing grounds,
which are hundreds of miles away from the disputed island.2
It is easy to imagine why a country would do its utmost to prove its
title over a disputed territory by collecting evidence, which usually consists,
in large part, of maps.3  International law, however, has a very distinctive
t The author would like to thank the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal editorial staff for their
support. Any errors or omissions are the author's own.
Keith Highet, Evidence, the Court, and the Nicaragua Case, 81 AM. J. INT'LL. 1, 18 (1987).
2 Since the adoption of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, countries
frequently rely on small islands as base points for claiming hundreds of miles of the ocean as their
Exclusive Economic Zones. R. R. CHURCHILL & A. V. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 50, 163-64 (3d ed.
1999).
DURWARD V. SANDIFER, EVIDENCE BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 229 (2d ed. 1975).
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rule that limits the evidentiary value of maps.4 Traditionally, international
tribunals were more restrictive in evaluating maps than almost any other
kind of evidence. 5 In most instances, they regarded maps as secondary
evidence at best, and frequently as hearsay in character. 6 Consequently, the
evidentiary value of maps often becomes one of the most contentious issues
in international boundary or territory disputes.7 Further complicating the
matter, not all courts and tribunals accord the same value to map evidence.
8
The traditional approach on the evidentiary value of map evidence
may, however, be losing its force under current international law. A look
into the current practice of international tribunals reveals that maps are
treated quite differently today from the traditional approach.9 Although the
tribunals are not yet openly condemning the traditional rule, 1' they are
bestowing more evidentiary value to maps than ever before."
This Comment intends to provide some insights into the implications
of this change. Theoretically speaking, the change in the attitudes of various
international tribunals may be a sign that the relevant customary
international law ("CIL") is in transition. For this reason, this Comment
will provide a careful analysis of the decisions of major international
tribunals, including the International Court of Justice ("ICJ"), the Permanent
Court of International Justice ("PCIJ"), and the Permanent Court of
Arbitration ("PCA").
This Comment will then analyze the approaches of national legal
systems to show that the emerging new rule on map evidence is in closer




See infra Part III.
SANDIFER, supra note 3, at 229-40.
9 Contemporary jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice ("ICJ") contains several
examples. In the Minquiers and Ecrehos case, the defendant submitted a chart, which was admitted in
evidence and used against the respondent, during the course of negotiations. Guenter Weissberg, Maps as
Evidence in International Boundary Disputes: A Reappraisal, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 781, 803 (1963)
(construing Minquiers and Ecrehos (Fr. U.K.), 1953 I.C.J. 47 (Nov. 17)). Further, even though the parties
introduced numerous unofficial neutral maps to illustrate their arguments, only one jurist opined that maps
had little evidentiary value. Id. at 787. In the Frontier Land case, the applicant's military map carried
considerable weight in support of the view that the plots belonged to the plaintiff state; "in the Temple of
Preah Vihear case, reliance was placed on the respondent's maps to demonstrate a subsequent course of
conduct and to confirm the conclusion that the defendant state was precluded from contending that she had
not accepted the map line." Id. at 803 (construing Frontier Land (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 IC.J. 554
(Dec. 22), and Temple ofPreah Vihear (Thail. v. Cambodia), 1962 I.C.J. 6 (June 15)).
'o Highet, supra note 1, at 17.
" Frontier Dispute, 1986 I.C.J. 554, 582-83, paras. 55-56.
I2 One of the best ways to discover any change in CIL is to look into the decisions of international
tribunals. MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 65 (4th ed. 1997).
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law recognized by civilized nations ("GPL"). 13 Domestic laws of two
countries-Australia and the United States-will be examined for this
purpose. Although the two countries do not, by any means, represent GPL
in a general sense, a brief survey of other legal systems demonstrates that
domestic laws reveal a common attitude regarding the evidentiary value of
map evidence.
14
In practice, the emerging importance of map evidence under
international law may have some significant consequences for countries
involved in territory or boundary disputes. Countries which have stronger
map evidence may have a significant advantage under the emerging
evidentiary rule. Two territorial disputes within the Pacific Rim region will
show the importance of map evidence and how the change in law may, albeit
hypothetically, affect the outcome of the disputes, which in turn may change
the attitude of the disputing parties.
Part II describes the traditional rule on map evidence, which may be
too restrictive for international adjudications. Although international
tribunals have not yet openly acknowledged their change of attitude, a
careful analysis reveals the evolving status of map evidence under
customary international law in Part III. Part III will also explain how this
change better reflects the general practice of national courts, as is shown by
the examples of Australia and the U.S. Part IV will then show what
practical implications the transition may have in international disputes by
using two disputes from the Pacific Rim region as examples-the Russo-
Japanese dispute over the Southern Kuril islands, and the Japanese-Korean
dispute over Dokdo/Takeshima island.
II. MAPS WERE ACCEPTED ONLY AS COLLATERAL EVIDENCE UNDER
TRADITIONAL CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
Traditional customary international law has been reluctant to place
much evidentiary value on maps in determining the location of a boundary.15
Even official maps issued or approved by a governmental agency have been
ignored in many cases. 16 There are three ways a map may be relevant in an
international dispute. First, the parties may submit cartographic evidence as
13 Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, June 26, 1945 59 Stat. 1055 (entered into
force Oct. 24, 1945) [hereinafter Statute of Court].
14 France and Germany showed a similar attitude towards map evidence. See infra note 136.
15 Weissberg, supra note 9, at 781.
16 Id. In a case where a treaty defined a boundary and a delimitation commission subsequently
surveyed the area and prepared a map inconsistent with the treaty provision, the intent of the parties was
held to be the governing factor; symbols on a map had little value when in conflict with the treaty. Id.
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real evidence of their claims regarding the location of a bourdary.17 Second,
maps may offer proof of the exercise of sovereignty over a disputed area or
as evidence of a litigant's intention. 18 That is, maps may be offered as
evidence demonstrating "an act of a state such as agreement to a given
boundary or state of affairs; they can also show an omission of a state such
as acquiescence in an indicated boundary through failure to register
sufficient protest against it." 19 Finally, maps may constitute evidence of
particular types of facts. In this regard, "the technical and scientific maps
and charts produced during the maritime delimitation cases of the early
1980s played a peculiar role., 20 They were used primarily "to persuade the
[tribunal] that certain elements of the 'relevant circumstances' should be
accorded a particular treatment., 21 Since the "relevant circumstances" often
decide the outcome of maritime delimitation disputes, treatment of the
22
constituting factors becomes a very sensitive issue. International law on
the evidentiary power of map evidence covers all three types of
circumstances where maps can be used as evidence.23
Many leading scholars of international law have advocated the
retention of the traditional status of maps in international law.24 As early as
1933, Professor Hyde, an acclaimed professor of international law, wrote
that even a series of maps, no matter how scientifically accurate and
numerous, does not necessarily prove the correctness of a boundary.25
According to Hyde, the boundaries described by maps may not be accepted
as the legal basis of the proper frontier, "especially when they are
contradicted by trustworthy evidence of title.' '26 In another of his writings
Hyde quotes from the 1927 Canada-Newfoundland Boundary Dispute in the
Labrador Peninsula, where the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
ruled that maps, "even when issued or accepted by the departments of the
:7 Highet, supra note 1, at 18.
" Weissberg, supra note 9, at 803.
19 Highet, supra note 1, at 19. This may play an important role in the Russo-Japanese dispute,
explained infra Part IV.
20 Highet, supra note 1, at 18.
21 id.
22 MALCOLM D. EVANS, RELEVANT CIRCUMSTANCES AND MARITIME DELIMITATION 15-43 (1989).
23 See Highet, supra note 1, at 19.
24 IAN BROWNLIE, THE RULE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 156 (1998).
25 Charles C. Hyde, Maps as Evidence in International Boundary Disputes, 27 AM. J. INT'L L. 311,
316 (1933).
26 Professor Hyde argued that even if maps effectively admitted the location of a boundary in a
certain place, the governmental bodies that produced them could not be shown to have had the authority to
make such admissions. Id.
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Canadian Government, cannot be treated as admissions .binding on that
Government.,
27
In 1939, Professor Sandifer, an expert on the law of evidence in
international law, stressed the hearsay character of many of the maps
introduced in evidence in boundary arbitrations as proof of contested
geographical and political facts. He wrote:
It is necessary only to reiterate here that maps furnish an
especially forceful illustration of the dangers inherent in the use
of hearsay evidence. As to geographical facts, maps are hearsay
evidence unless they are based upon an original survey of the
natural features depicted by the map. As to political facts, they
are hearsay in character unless the line portraying the boundary
on the map was drawn or officially adopted by the officials
responsible for the negotiation and definition of the boundary,
or unless the map was prepared by an individual or commission
designated to survey and chart the line. So far as the question
of the extent of the sovereignty of any given state is concerned,
therefore, maps are, in a very great majority of cases, hearsay or
secondary in character.28
As recently as 1997, Ian Brownlie, one of the most eminent scholars
in international law, argued that the cautious approach by international
tribunals, which severely restricts the role of map evidence, is appropriate in
light of the relevant precedents. 29 Brownlie offers an exhaustive list of
categories of circumstances in which maps are given probative value, but a
careful examination reveals these categories are not at variance with the
traditional approach. 30  Hence, Brownlie refers to the traditional view on
map evidence as an "appropriately cautious approach. ' 31
27 Id. at 315; see also Indo-Pakistan Western Boundary (India v. Pak.), 17 R.I.A.A. 1, 87 (Perm. Ct.
Arb. 1968).
2 Indo-Pakistan Western Boundary, 17 R.I.A.A. 1, 85.
29 BROWNLIE, supra note 24.
30 Browrlie's eight categories are: (1) Map evidence and treaty interpretation: maps as parts of the
preparatory work; (2) Map evidence and the subsequent practice of the parties; (3) Contemporaneous
practical interpretation by the parties attested by maps of other governments; (4) Maps as evidence of acts
of jurisdiction; (5) Notoriety and openness of exercise of sovereignty evidenced by maps; (6) Admissions
and acquiescence in the form of map evidence; (7) The opinion of authoritative official persons as a form
of map evidence; (8) Maps as evidence of non-official professional opinion: evidence of general opinion of
repute. Id. at 156-61.
"' Id. at 156.
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One of the biggest problems with maps is that,. "like statistics,
cartography can 'lie.' 32  Thus, international jurists and tribunals have
debated not so much the technical accuracy of the maps introduced as
evidence, but rather their political correctness. 33 The International Court of
Justice, in its Frontier Dispute decision, 3 sheds some light on why
international tribunals were so critical of map evidence in this regard. 35
Generally speaking, "a natural degree of enhancement or exaggeration" in
the map may be "necessary even to perceive any difference between one
sector and another" in the map; maps in such cases imply that people put
"legal conclusions" in them. 36 International tribunals, however, have
traditionally ignored such maps almost in their entirety.37
Traditional international law has restricted the evidentiary effects of
maps more than any other kind of evidence. Judges, lawyers, and scholars
have long warned against any reliance upon maps in international law.38
Consequently, international tribunals have generally restricted the role of
map evidence to corroborate conclusions reached on the basis of other
evidence.
39
III. EVOLUTION OF THE NEW RULE ON MAP EVIDENCE IS TAKING PLACE IN
Two MAJOR SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Under Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ there are three main sources
of international law: "international conventions," "international customs,"
32 Highet, supra note 1, at 19.
33 Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554, 582-83, paras. 54-56 (Dec. 22).
'4 See infra Part Ill.
35 The ICJ stated:
Other considerations which determine the weight of maps as evidence relate to the neutrality of
their sources towards the dispute in question and the parties to that dispute. Since relatively
distant times, judicial decisions have treated maps with a considerable degree of caution: less so
in more recent decisions, at least as regards the technical reliability of maps. But even where the
guarantees described above are present, maps can still have no greater legal value than that of
corroborative evidence endorsing a conclusion at which a court has arrived by other means
unconnected with the maps. In consequence, except when the maps are in the category of a
physical expression of the will of the State, they cannot in themselves alone be treated as
evidence of a frontier, since in that event they would form an irrebuttable presumption,
tantamount in fact to legal title. The only value they possess is as evidence of an auxiliary or
confirmatory kind, and this also means that they cannot be given the character of a rebuttable or
juris tantum presumption such as to effect a reversal of the onus of proof.
Frontier Dispute, 1986 I.C.J. 554, 583, para. 56.
36 Highet, supra note 1, at 19.
37 id.
3 Hyde, supra note 25, at 313.
39 BROWNLIE, supra note 24, at 156.
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and "general principles of law recognized by civilized nations. ' 4° Because
there is no general treaty dealing with the evidentiary value of maps, the
rules on map evidence fall under either the rubric of CIL or under GPL.
International law scholars generally regard the rule on map evidence as part
of the CIL, 4' which necessitates the analysis of several ICJ and PCA
decisions recognizing and authenticating the rules of CIL with regard to map
evidence.42 However, the rule governing the evidentiary effect of map
evidence may in fact fall under general principles of law rather than CIL.
Thus, the laws of two countries-Australia and the United States-which
possess detailed rules on map evidence, will be analyzed as examples to
reveal the general principles of law on this issue.
A. Customary International Law on the Evidentiary Value of Maps is in
Transition
International tribunals play a leading role in the development of CIL.43
Article 38(l)(b) of the Statute of the ICJ, which is "generally regarded as a
complete statement of the sources of international law," 44 directs the Court
to consider "international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted
as law.'45 The material sources of custom include international and national
46judicial decisions. Judicial decisions of international tribunals are not,
strictly speaking, a formal source of international law, but they are often
referred to as authoritative evidence of the state of the law.47 Formally, the
role of international tribunals "is confined to ascertaining and applying law
which binds only the parties in the case.' '48 In actual practice, however, they
play a considerable role in the development of international customary law.49
Seeking a legal basis for their decisions, international tribunals gather and
evaluate all available facts which can support the existence of a certain
custom. 5° Because such facts are rarely complete and unequivocal, the
tribunals' decisions on the existence of a binding rule "often amount[s] to
40 STATUTE OF COURT, art. 38; MARTIN DIXON, TEXTBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 21-22 (4th ed.
2000); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 3-5 (5th ed. 2003).
41 BROWNLIE, supra note 24, at 156-61.
42 BROWNLIE, supra note 40, at 20.
43 ANTHONY A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 43 (1971); KAROL
WOLFKE, CUSTOM IN PRESENT INTERNATIONAL LAW 71-76 (1964).
44 BROWNLIE, supra note 40, at 5.
45 STATUTE OF COURT, art. 38.
46 BROWNLIE, supra note 40, at 6.
41 Id. at 19.
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choosing the less doubtful alternative. ' 51 Hence, an international judicial
organ ascertaining custom to some degree creates it.
5 2
Two major international tribunals, the PCA and the ICJ, have dealt
with the issue of map evidence for many decades. Their decisions represent
the current status of maps in international law. Five of their recent
adjudications-two from the PCA and three from the ICJ-are especially
helpful in identifying the current status of maps. The tribunals have dealt
with the issue of the evidentiary value of maps quite bluntly in these cases.
An analysis of the six decisions that follows reveals the heightened status of
map evidence under the current CIL, and the factors the tribunals take into
account when deciding the amount of deference they will give to maps.
1. Decisions of the Permanent Court ofArbitration
a. The Rann of Kutch Arbitration (India v. Pakistan)
The Rann of Kutch Arbitration, also called the Indo-Pakistan Western
Boundary Case, illustrates the typical attitude of international tribunals
toward map evidence. The Rann of Kutch is "a desolate area encompassing
approximately 8,000 square miles of salt wastes, brakish ponds, marsh and
isolated, rocky, elevated bets.",53 The dispute arose out of the territorial
conflicts between India and Pakistan that took place along their borders in
1965. 54 Through the good offices of the Prime Minister of the United
Kingdom, the two states terminated military actions and agreed to refer the
boundary dispute to arbitration.55
In the arbitration award ("Award") of 1968, the PCA was wary of
openly acknowledging the evidentiary effect of maps, but relied on maps in
order to reach its decision. The Award generally did not give much weight
to map evidence due to "demonstrable inaccuracy, vagueness and
inconsistencies," 56 but survey maps were accorded much more weight than
51 Id.
52 Lazare Kopelmanas, Custom as a Means of the Creation of International Law, 18 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 141 (1937).
53 OFFICE OF THE GEOGRAPHER, BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH, INTERNATIONAL
BOUNDARY STUDY: INDIA-PAKISTAN BOUNDARY 3 (Dec. 2, 1968), available at
http://www.law.fsu.eduflibrary/collection/LimitsinSeasflBS086.pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 2005).
54 Id.
55 id.
56 Indo-Pakistan Western Boundary (India v. Pakistan), 17 R.I.A.A. 1, 535 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1968). A
thorough analysis revealed that none of the original survey maps of the disputed territory depicted the
boundary claimed by one of the parties. Id. at 540. The Arbitration Tribunal ruled that none of the so-
called compiled maps, which by and large incorporated the boundary depiction adopted in the so-called
basic original survey maps, can have independent significance except on either of two grounds. First, a
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other types of maps 7  The Tribunal stated that even though there was no
historically-recognized and well-established boundary in the disputed
region, the statements and the maps could be interpreted as acquiescence in
such claims.58 This in turn could "amount to a voluntary relinquishment,
whether conscious or inadvertent," of the other party's territorial rights in
the area.59 Thus, while the Tribunal relied on map evidence in determining a
wide range of issues, it was careful not to openly affirm the evidentiary
value of maps in its rulings.
60
b. Arbitration Between Eritrea and Yemen
The PCA admitted and recognized a broad category of maps as
evidence in this case. 61 The dispute involved several groups of islands in
the Southern Red Sea: the Mohabbakah islands, the Haycock islands, the
Hanish-Zuquar Islands, and the Jabal al-Tayr and the Zubayr Group of
Islands.62 Their location, partly along the shipping lanes connecting to the
strategically critical Strait of Bab el-Mandeb ("Gate of Lament") and the
southern approaches to the Suez Canal, raised a possible threat to
international navigation.6 3
party may argue that extraneous circumstances, such as express approval or other forms of official sanction
by authorities outside and above the Survey Department, invested the maps with a greater degree of
authority than would be conferred upon them by the mere fact of their issue. Second, the cumulative effect
of the publication of official maps in conjunction with other acts or omissions by the British authorities,
and the interpretation placed on the maps by those concerned at the time, could be such that the maps must
be given decisive weight in determining the issues confronting the Tribunal. Id.
" See id.at 535-41.
I Id. at 553.
59 Id.
6o The Tribunal clearly indicated this point when it ruled that "the evidence on record leaves no room
for doubt that none of the maps produced in this case was a conclusive and authoritative source of title to
territory, except [one map,] on which the boundary delimitation made in the Resolution of 1914 was
authoritatively depicted.... However... this depiction... covered only a portion of the boundary at
issue." Id. at 566.
61 The importance of the Eritrea-Yemen case was indicated by the membership of the Arbitral
Tribunal. In conformity with the Arbitration Agreement (Article 1), Eritrea appointed as Arbitrators two
Members of the International Court of Justice, then President Stephen M. Schwebel and Judge Rosalyn
Higgins, and Yemen appointed two of the leading international counsel, Mr. Keith Highet and Dr. Ahmed
Sadek E1-Kosheri. Eritrea-Yemen Arbitration (Award, Phase I: Territorial Sovereignty) (Oct. 9, 1998)
available at http://pca-cpa.org/PDF/EY%20Phase%20I.PDF (last visited Jan. 23, 2005). Following the
agreement of the Parties to this effect, on Jan. 14, 1997 the four Arbitrators appointed the former President
of the ICJ, Sir Robert Y. Jennings, as President of the Tribunal. Id.
62 Barbara Kwiatkowska, The Eritrea/Yemen Arbitration: Landmark Progress in the Acquisition of
Territorial Sovereignty and Equitable Maritime Boundary Delimitation, 32 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 1, 3-4
(20012" Id.
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Eritrea claimed the islands primarily on the basis of the Treaty of
Lausanne (1923) whereby the Ottoman empire relinquished its rights to
them.64 Eritrean government argued that Italy gained sovereignty5 over the
islands in 1923 and Eritrea inherited the sovereignty from Italy.65 Yemen,
on the other hand, claimed the islands principally on the basis of a theory of
66 ta hreversion, arguing that the islands were historically Yemeni and after the
Ottoman Empire left in 1923, the islands reverted back to their original
owner (Yemen).67 The Tribunal rejected both arguments.68
After rejecting the principal arguments of the two parties, the Tribunal
applied the "principles, rules and practices of international law."69 In this
regard, the Tribunal noted that the parties used maps for different purposes
and stated that they had relevance to the dispute in several different ways.70
The parties to this case attributed different values to the overall significance
of maps. Eritrea's position was that "map evidence in general ... was
contradictory and unreliable" and could not be used to establish valid claims
to territory.71 Yemen's position was exactly the opposite. It provided four
bases for its use of maps: "as 'important evidence of general opinion or
repute;' as evidence of the attitudes of governments; to reveal the intention
of the Parties in respect of state actions; and as evidence of acquiescence or
admissions against interest.,
72
The PCA divided the maps into different time periods and ruled on
their evidentiary value. It is noteworthy that the Court admitted and
recognized a broad category of maps as evidence.73 More importantly, the
Court evaluated the relevant maps according to their period of production. It
divided the production period into six categories and distinguished the
6' Eritrea-Yemen Arbitration at 99, para. 363.
65 id.
6 Id. at paras. 31-34.
67 id.
69 Id. at 125-26, paras. 448-50.
69 Id. at 9-10, 23, 30-31, paras. 31, 81, 102, 103.
70 Eritrea-Yemen Arbitration at 99, para. 363.
71 Id. at 99-100, para. 367.
72 Id.
" The Tribunal made an interesting comment about the use of maps by the United Nations:
Yemen has introduced maps from the period of early 1950s to demonstrate that the United
Nations considered the Islands not to be part of Eritrea. The key evidence is a United Nations
map from 1950. Eritrea has vigorously contested the accuracy of this map, its provenance,
authenticity and effect, saying that "[n]o official map was adopted by the United Nations."
Id. at 101-2, para. 376. The Tribunal ruled that a publication of a map by the United Nations does not
amount to its "recognition of sovereign title to territory." Id. at 102, para. 377. It was so regardless of
whether the map was attached as an official commission map, as evidence of compromise, or merely
as an illustration. Id. at para. 378.
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values each of them held.74 Although the Court reached its ultimate decision
on the basis of evidence other than maps, it commented that the map
evidence would have been of greater importance had there been no other
evidence in the record.75 Even where maps produced by the parties were
beset with contradictions and uncertainties, the Court ruled that one party's
map evidence was superior in scope and volume to that of the other. This
decision not only demonstrates the Tribunal's willingness to recognize the
evidentiary value of maps, but also implies that contradictory maps
introduced by the parties do not necessarily cancel out each other's
evidentiary value. This is significant because it would be common for
opposing parties to introduce contradicting maps.
Further, with regard to a number of maps produced by third parties
such as independent or commercial cartographic sources, or the intelligence,
mapping and navigational authorities of third party states, the Court ruled
that although it must be wary of this evidence in the sense that it cannot be
used as indicative of legal title, it is nonetheless "important evidence of
general opinion or repute." 77  Maps produced by neutral sources will
therefore receive higher deference from the tribunals.
2. Decisions of the International Court of Justice on Maps as Evidence
a. The Temple of Preah Vihear Case (Cambodia v. Thailand)
The Temple case is often referred to as the turning point for
evaluating map evidence in international tribunals.78 The subject of this
dispute was sovereignty over the region of the Temple of Preah Vihear.79
The dispute originated from the boundary settlements reached in 1904-1908
between France (then the Protectorate over Cambodia) and Siam (as
Thailand was then called). 80 The Treaty of February 13, 1904, ("Treaty")
was especially at issue.81 Article 1 of the Treaty provided that the general
character of the frontier along the eastern section of the Dangrek range, in
71 See Eritrea-Yemen Arbitration at 104, para. 388.
75 Id. at 101, para. 375.
76 Id. at 104, para. 388.
77 Id. at 102, paras. 380-81.
78 Weissberg, supra note 9, at 792.
79 Temple of Preah Vihear (Thail. v. Cambodia), 1962 I.C.J. 6 (June 15) (summary of judgment),
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which the Temple was situated, was to follow the watershed line.8 2 In
accordance with Article 3 of the Treaty, a Franco-Siamese Mixed
Commission was formed to delimit the frontiers. 83 The Commission
subsequently surveyed and fixed a frontier, but no record on the Dangrek
region was made. 4
The final stage of the delimitation was the preparation of maps. 85 The
Siamese government, which did not possess adequate technical means,
requested French officers to map the frontier region.8 6 A team of French
officers, some of whom had been members of the Mixed Commission,
completed eleven maps in the autumn of 1907 and transmitted them to the
Siamese government. 7 One of these maps was a map of the Dangrek range
showing Preah Vihear on the Cambodian side.88 Cambodia relied mainly on
this map to claim sovereignty over the Temple.8 9 Thailand, on the other
hand, contended that the map, not being the work of the Commission, was
not binding. Further, Thailand argued that the true watershed line would
place the Temple in Thailand.90
The map in question was never formally approved by the Mixed
Commission. 9 However, the Court found that there was "no reasonable
doubt" that the map had an "inherent technical authority" of its own, and an
,92origin which was "open and obvious." Even though the Court held that the
map did not have a "binding character... at the moment of its production,"
Cambodia prevailed.93 The Court saw the issue not in terms of whether the
Commission had discretionary power to depart from the watershed line, but
whether the parties had adopted the map and its line, which was far to the
north from the watershed boundary, as representing the outcome of the work
of the Commission, thereby conferring on it a binding character.
94
Since the Temple case, maps have explicitly gained greater import.
95




85 Temple of Preah Vihear, 1962 I.C.J. 6 (summary ofjudgment).
96Id.
:7 Weissberg, supra note 9, at 793.






94 Temple of Preah Vihear, 1962 I.C.J. 6 (summary ofjudgment).
95 Weissberg, supra note 9, at 801.
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Court treated the map as if it were part of the treaty.96 The ICJ found that
the map had never been approved by the Commission, the appropriate
authority, and thus did not have a binding character. 97 Nevertheless, the
Court based its final decision on the map.98 Such an approach is noteworthy,
for, in essence, it amounted to a finding that, in a conflict between a map not
even referred to in the agreement or signed by the parties and a boundary
definition described in a treaty, the map prevailed.99 According to the ICJ,
in the interest of certainty, stability, and finality of frontiers, an unsigned
map in derogation of a treaty provision would supersede the text as a matter
of treaty interpretation.'00 This approach was a significant departure from
earlier decisions.
101
b. Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v. Mali)
The Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v. Mali), on
its face, represents the conservative stance of international tribunals when
dealing with map evidence.'0 2  Both parties to the dispute were formerly
French colonies, Upper Volta and French Sudan respectively. 103 After
failing to reach an agreement concerning three hundred kilometers of their
common frontier, which was regarded to be rich in minerals, the parties
submitted the colonies' dispute to the ICJ. 104 The two parties submitted an
96 Id.
9' Id. at 793.
98 In the eyes of the majority, the respondent state had accepted, adopted, recognized or acquiesced
in the erroneous map as representing the outcome of the delimitation and had precluded itself from
contesting its validity; approval was given as early as 1908 as a result of certain circumstances, such as the
wide distribution of the maps and their acknowledgement by the Minister of the Interior. Id. at 801-2.
99 Id. at 798.
"0 Id. at 802.
101 Id.
102 The Court ruled that,
[M]aps merely constitute information which varies in accuracy from case to case; of themselves,
and by virtue solely of their existence, they cannot constitute a territorial title, that is, a
document endowed by international law with intrinsic legal force for the purpose of establishing
territorial rights. Of course, in some cases maps may acquire such legal force, but where this is
so the legal force does not arise solely from their intrinsic merits: it is because such maps fall
into the category of physical expressions of the will of the State or States concerned. This is the
case, for example, when maps are annexed to an official text of which they form an integral part.
Except in this clearly defined case, maps are only extrinsic evidence of varying reliability or
unreliability which may be used, along with other evidence of a circumstantial kind, to establish
or reconstitute the real facts.
Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554, 582, para. 54 (Dec. 22) available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/icases/iHVM/ihvnijudgment/ihvrnijudgment19861222.pdf (last Jan. 23, 2005).
103 MARTIN DIXON & ROBERT McCORQUODALE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW
234 (3d ed. 2000).
104 id.
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abundant and varied "collection of cartographic materials" and argued in
considerable detail their probative force.'
0 5
The Court, as usual, denounced the role of maps by saying that maps
were merely extrinsic evidence which may be used, along with other
evidence, to establish the real facts. 106 The Court went on to say that
although the parties presented the Court with a considerable body of maps,
for a region that is nevertheless described as partly unknown, no
indisputable frontier line could be discerned. 107 The Court's detailed
explanation on the evidentiary value of maps in this case has been repeatedly
quoted in other cases. 0 8 It stresses the Court's reluctance to admit any
change in the evidentiary power of maps by elaborating on the problems
map evidence might entail. 9 The Court also stated that it could not uphold
any information given by the map where it was contradicted by other
trustworthy information. 1 i
The Court's statements renouncing the role of maps, however, seems
to be mere rhetoric. Ultimately, the Court ruled that "[t]wo of the maps
:05 Frontier Dispute, 1986 I.C.J. pt. 7 (summary ofjudgment).
106 Id.
107 id.
'0' See Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Bots. v. Namib.), 1999 I.C.J. 1045, 1098-99, para. 84 (Dec. 13);
Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indon. v. Malay.), 2002 I.C.J. 102, para. 88 (Dec. 17).
'09 The Court gave indications as to why the evidentiary value of map evidence might be in transition
when it ruled:
The actual weight to be attributed to maps as evidence depends on a range of considerations.
Some of these relate to the technical reliability of the maps. This has considerably increased,
owing particularly to the progress achieved by aerial and satellite photography since the 1950s.
But the only result is a more faithful rendering of nature by map, and an increasingly accurate
match between the two. Information derived from human intervention, such as the names of
places and of geographical features (the toponymy) and the depiction of frontiers and other
political boundaries, does not thereby become more reliable. Of course, the reliability of the
toponymic information has also increased, although to a lesser degree, owing to verification on
the ground; but in the opinion of cartographers, errors are still common in the representation of
frontiers, especially when these are shown in border areas to which access is difficult. Other
considerations which determine the weight of maps as evidence relate to the neutrality of their
sources towards the dispute in question and the parties to that dispute. Since relatively distant
times, judicial decisions have treated maps with a considerable degree of caution: less so in more
recent decisions, at least as regards the technical reliability of maps. But even where the
guarantees described above are present, maps can still have no greater legal value than that of
corroborative evidence endorsing a conclusion at which a court has arrived by other means
unconnected with the maps. In consequence, except when the maps are in the category of a
physical expression of the will of the State, they cannot in themselves alone be treated as
evidence of a frontier, since in that event they would form an irrebuttable presumption,
tantamount in fact to legal title. The only value they possess is as evidence of an auxiliary or
confirmatory kind, and this also means that they cannot be given the character of a rebuttable or
juris tantum presumption such as to effect a reversal of the onus of proof.
Frontier Dispute, 1986 I.C.J. 554, 582-83, paras. 55-56.
"o Id. at 586, para. 62.
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produced appear to be of special significance."11' The Court found that one
of the maps, even while lacking a legal title, was a visual portrayal both of
the available texts and of information obtained on this ground, because it had
been drawn up by a body neutral to the parties.'1 2 After noting the date on
which the maps were made and the neutrality of the sources, the Court relied
heavily on one of the maps and explained that the probative value of a map
may play a "decisive role" where all other evidence is insufficient, or does
not clarify an exact line." 13
Despite the reserved attitude on its face, this case therefore provides
some useful insights into how international tribunals treat map evidence in
practice. According to the Court, the value of maps depends on their
technical reliability and their neutrality in relation to the dispute.
Consequently, while rhetorically denouncing the importance of maps,
international tribunals may actually be treating maps as important, even
decisive, evidence in ascertaining boundary lines or territorial titles.
c. Case Concerning Sovereignty Over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan
(Indonesia v. Malaysia)
One of the most recent cases on map evidence decided by the ICJ
plainly demonstrates the discrepancy between the traditional theory on map
evidence and the practice of international tribunals. In the Case Concerning
Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia v. Malaysia),
the ICJ ruled on the Indonesian and Malaysian claims to the territory of
Ligitan and Sipadan islands and the validity of map evidence submitted by
the parties." 4 Both Parties produced a series of maps in support of their
respective interpretations of the 1891 Convention between the Netherlands
and Great Britain, previous colonial owners of the relevant territories.
Indonesia contended that the maps it had produced "[we]re consistent in
depicting the boundary line as extending offshore to the north of the known
locations of the islands of Ligitan and Sipadan, thus leaving them on what is
"' These were the 1:500,000 scale map of the colonies of French West Africa, 1925 edition, known
as the Blondel la Rougery map, and the 1:200,000 scale map of West Africa, issued by the French Institut
G~ographique National and originally published between 1958 and 1960. Id.
Id.
113 Id.
14 The islands of Ligitan and Sipadan are both located in the Celebes Sea, off the northeast coast of
the island of Borneo. The present dispute crystallized in 1969 in the context of discussions concerning the
continental shelf delinitations of Indonesia and Malaysia. Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau
Sipadan (Indon. v. Malay.), 2002 I.C.J. 102, para. 31 (Dec. 17) available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iinma/iirnajudgmentiinmnaijudgment 20021217.PDF (last visited Jan. 23, 2005).
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now the Indonesian side of the line."' 1 5  In Malaysia's view, contrary to
what Indonesia contended, some of the Dutch maps clearly showed the
boundary terminating at the east coast of Sebatik. 16 Malaysia asserted that
even Indonesian maps published since 1969 did not show the islands as
Indonesian. 117  Malaysia moreover argued that on the majority of these
latter maps the islands of Ligitan and Sipadan were either not shown at all,
or were in the wrong place. 118 In support of its interpretation of the
Convention, Malaysia relied in particular on the map annexed to the 1915
Agreement between Great Britain and the Netherlands. 119 According to
Malaysia, this was the only official map agreed upon by the parties. 120
The Court started out by quoting its opinion on map evidence from the
Burkina Faso v. Mali decision.'I 1 It was apparent that it had no intention of
openly departing from the traditional view.122 Nevertheless, one of the maps
played a pivotal role in this case. 123 The Court accepted the map as
conclusive evidence because there was proof that both parties had agreed
upon it.124 Whether there is sufficient proof that the parties agreed upon a
map is often a hotly debated issue. If proven, it will undoubtedly increase
the evidentiary value of the map. Further, if one of the parties can submit
maps actually produced by the other party, preferably by a government, the
"' Id. at para. 83.
16 Id. at para. 84.
117 Id.
118 Id.
19 Id. at para. 85.
120 Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan, 2002 I.C.J. 102, para. 85.
21 Id. at para. 88.
122 The Court discounted the legal value of most of the maps. After carefully analyzing the
inconsistencies and the specific purposes of these maps, it deemed them to be inconclusive. The Court also
observed that no map reflecting the agreed views of the parties had been appended to the Convention,
which would have officially expressed the will of Great Britain and the Netherlands as to the prolongation
of the boundary line. Id. at paras. 47-48, 90-91.
123 The Court, nevertheless, showed a different attitude towards the map annexed to the 1915
Agreement. Id. It was important that this map was the only one which was agreed between the parties to
the 1891 Convention. Id.
124 The Court ruled that:
[It] considers that an examination of the map annexed to the 1915 Agreement reinforces the
Court's interpretation of that Agreement. The Court observes that the map, together with the
map annexed to the 1928 Agreement, is the only one which was agreed between the parties to
the 1891 Convention. The Court notes on this map that an initial southward extension of the line
indicating the boundary between the Netherlands possessions and the other States under British
protection is shown beyond the western endpoint of the boundary defined in 1915, while a
similar extension does not appear beyond the point situated on the east coast of Sebatik; that
latter point was, in all probability, meant to indicate the spot where the boundary ended.... In
sum, with exception of the map annexed to the 1915 Agreement... the cartographic material
submitted by the Parties is inconclusive in respect of the interpretation of Article IV of the 1891
Convention.
Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan, 2002 I.C.J. 102, at paras. 72, 91.
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evidentiary value of such maps will receive more deference. This issue may
play an important role in the Territorial Dispute between Japan and Korea
over Dokdo/Takeshima.12
5
While international tribunals still encounter maps as frequently as in
the past, their decisions reveal that the approach to the evidentiary value of
maps has undergone considerable change. The arguments for the traditional
approach 126 advanced until the 1940s 127 are no longer applicable today as
they were in the past. 128 The outdated observations that argue against
according any evidentiary value to maps only show the gap that has been
created between the theory and practice of international law on map
evidence.
B. The Emerging Rule on Map Evidence Will Better Conform to General
Principles of Law
1. General Principles of Law Should Reflect Domestic Rules on Map
Evidence
Even if the custom of according greater probative value to maps has
not yet reached the status of CIL, its further development would correspond
better to GPL. GPL is one of the major sources of international law under
the ICJ Statute.'2 9 There are conflicting opinions as to the nature of this
source, but the majority view regards GPL as comprising of the rules and
principles common to major legal systems. 130 According to this view, if
international law is to be accepted as a system of law, it must incorporate the
procedural and administrative rules which are inherent in the concept of
every legal system.131 International law may have large gaps as a legal
:z See infra Part IV.
126 These include Drs. Hyde and Sandifer. Weissberg, supra note 9, at 801.
127 The Permanent Court of International Justice produced a typical example of the traditional
approach in its Advisory Opinion on the Jaworzina Question. Hyde, supra note 26, at 316 (construing
Advisory Opinion on the Jaworzina Question, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 8). In this case, the Court carefully
pointed out that maps could be used only as secondary evidence. Id. However, it is interesting to note that
even though the Court did not expressly rule on the evidentiary value of maps in general, it proceeded to
confirm one of its conclusions based, in part, on maps submitted to it. The Court ruled that "[ilt is true that
maps and their tables of explanatory signs cannot be regarded as conclusive proof, independently of the text
of the treaties and decisions; but in the present case they confirm in a singularly convincing manner the
conclusions drawn from the documents and from a legal analysis of them, they are certainly not
contradicted by any document." Id.
128 Weissberg, supra note 9, at 803.
129 Statute of Court, art. 38.
130 Dixon, supra note 40, at 38-39.
131 Id.
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system because it deals with fewer cases than many domestic legal systems,
and there is no formal legislation to provide rules to govern new
situations. 132 GPL can help to close these gaps.' 33 In other words, GPL is
often borrowed from the common denominators of national legal systems to
fill in the gaps where neither the treaty law nor the CIL can resolve the
dispute. 134 Every international dispute should be capable of being
determined as a matter of law.
1 35
GPL regarding the treatment of map evidence can be particularly
helpful in supplementing the CIL gaps on the evidentiary value of maps.
Unlike international law, most national legal systems do not treat map
evidence differently than other general documentary evidence. 136 The
examples of treatment of maps in the national laws of Australia and the
United States are illustrative because they provide more explicit rules in this
regard than many other countries. An examination of the laws of the two
countries shows that domestic rules of evidence can inform CIL on the
evidentiary value of maps.
Rules of evidence represent a good example of the kind of GPL
prevailing in domestic forums that should be applied in international law.
Several pronouncements of the Mexican-American Claims Commission
stand for the proposition that intemational tribunals should adopt the GPL
prevailing in domestic forums relating to evidence.1 37 When it comes to the
appraisal of evidence, the American Commissioner in the Mexican-United
States Claims Commission said in 1927 that "the Commission can and must
give application to well-recognized principles underlying rules of evidence
and of course it must employ common sense reasoning in considering the
evidential value of the things which have been submitted to it as
evidence."'' 38 Speaking for the Commission in a subsequent case in 1930,
the same Commissioner said that "[w]ith respect to matters of evidence,
[international tribunals] must give effect to common sense principles
132 Shaw, supra note 12, at 78.
133 Id.
134 JEFFREY DUNOFF, INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS 32 (2002).
13' ROBERT JENNINGS & ARTHUR WATTS, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 13 (9th ed. 1992).
136 For example, France, Germany, and Korea all showed a similar attitude towards map evidence.
For French case law on this issue, see Cour d'Appel Toulouse, Cambre Civile 1, June 2, 2001, No. de
Decision: 2000/03425; Cour d'Appel Toulouse, Cambre Civile 1, Dec. 14, 1998, No. de Decision:
1997/03196; Law No. 00-439 of Jan. 16, 2001, DC (Loi relative i l'arch6ologie preventive). For German
case law on this issue, see, e.g., OVG NRW 19 A 546/02 (Mar. 26, 2004).
137 BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND
TRIBUNALS 307-08 (1987).
138 Id.
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underlying rules of evidence in domestic law."' 39 A GPL rule that reflects
the evidentiary rules of domestic courts will better serve its original purpose.
2. Australian Law Accords Stronger Evidentiary Value to Maps Than
Traditional International Law
Australian law generally does not discriminate against maps as
evidence. Maps, as part of general documentary evidence, enjoy the same
status as that of photographs and writings. 40 Most jurisdictions in Australia
seem to adhere to this rule.14' Although there is always some danger that a
party can forge maps, that danger is deemed to be no greater than that for
any other type of document, and is not itself ground to reject maps offered as
evidence. 142 This is so for both private and public maps.
143
Maps play a variety of roles in domestic courts as documentary
evidence. The most important role of maps in Australian courts is that of
evidence in boundary delimitation disputes. Australian courts rely on maps
when there is a dispute as to whether the demarcation lines in a map
represent the true intention of the parties. Such a dispute could arise when
the description in a map conflicts with the text of the agreement between the
parties. The courts in these circumstances pay great deference to public
maps. For example, in the State of Australia v. State of Victoria, the High
Court of Australia held that if a boundary was later found to have been
marked and located in the wrong place, no judicial authority could correct
the error. 45 The Court's deference to the map was even more prominent
because the Court made the decision despite the existence of conflicting
maps. 146 The Court acknowledged the evidentiary value of maps even
though the maps were not uniform in representing a certain boundary line. 147
It noted that admiralty charts and standard maps would-until discovery of
an error-show the boundary, and that it would be very hard for any litigant
to displace such a presumption or evidence. 148 Because the courts confer
139 id.
140 See Evidence Act, 1995, pt. 1 (Austl.); Evidence and Procedure (New Zealand) Act, 1994, sec. 3
(N.Z.); Foreign Evidence Act, 1994, sec. 3 (Austl.).
14' R. A. BROWN, DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE IN AUSTRALIA 34 (2d ed. 1996).
142 Id. at 26-34.
143 Public maps are those produced by public officers for the purpose of public use; all the other ones
are private maps. Id. at 62-63.
:44 Foreign Evidence Act 1994, sec. 3 (Austl.).
45 State of South Australia v. State of Victoria (1911), 12 CLR 667, 668.
146 Id. at 679-80.
147 Id. at 692, 695.
'41 Id. at 738.
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such a strong presumptive validity to maps, modem Australian statutes often
contain specific provisions regarding the evidentiary value of maps when the
legislators need to limit their validity.
49
At common law there is a presumption that private documents,
including private maps, more than thirty years old, produced from the proper
party, should be held valid.150 Most Australian jurisdictions even reduced
the age requirement to twenty years. 15 1 "The scope of the presumption
covers ... due compliance with all the formalities required to make the
documents effective."' 52 Although the evidentiary value of private maps
may also depend on various other factors, this presumption, which applies to
maps as documentary evidence, explains why maps in general hold a
different status in Australian law than in traditional international law.
As for public documents, those produced by the proper authority are
generally evidence of their contents.' 53 There is no need to otherwise prove
the accuracy of the document's contents. 54 In Wilton and Co. v. Phillips,
the court ruled that "[a] public document coming from the proper place or a
certified copy of it is sufficient proof of every particular stated in it.""' The
strength of this pronouncement has caused some critics to argue that when
the court used the phrase "sufficient proof," it meant nothing more than
"sufficient in the absence of other credible evidence to the contrary."' 156
Nevertheless, other courts have also held that a public document is evidence
of everything stated in it. In In Re Stollery: Weir v. Treasury Solicitor, the
court upheld the view that a public document is evidence of everything
stated in it. 157  Furthermore, in R. v. Halpin the Court ruled that "[a]ll
statements on the return are admissible as prima facie proof of the truth of
their contents."' 5
8
149 See, e.g., Defense Force Discipline Regulations, 1985, sec. 92 (Austl.) (providing that "[i]n any
proceedings a map, chart or plan purporting to be published by or on behalf of the Commonwealth or of a
State or Territory or of the government of another country is evidence of the matters set out on the map,
chart or plan unless the contrary is proved"); Crimes at Sea Act, 2000, sec. 16 (Austl.) (providing that
"[t]he map is intended to be indicative only. The provisions of this scheme and of the body of this Act
prevail over the map if there is any inconsistency").
:50 BROWN, supra note 141, at 57.
'51 Id. The period in the United Kingdom is also twenty years. Evidence Act 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6, § 4
(Eng.).
E'!1 BROWN, supra note 141, at 57.
Is3 Id. at 66 (citing Wilton and Co. v. Phillips (1903) 19 TLR 390).
154 Id.
155 BROWN, supra note 141, at 66 (citing Wilton and Co. v. Phillips (1903) 19 TLR 390).
1s6 Id. at 66-67.
'" Id. at 67.
's" (1975) 3 WLR 260, 265, cited in BROWN, supra note 141, at 68.
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A specific example of such a public document can be found in section
59 of the Evidence Act of 1910. This law allows officially certified copies
of maps or photographs to serve as evidence of the existence and location of
features in the map. 59 Based on the nature of the statute, it appears that the
legislature intended such public maps to provide evidence of features
depicted in them.160 In short, Australian law and the attitudes of Australian
courts show that domestic laws are more generous towards map evidence
than traditional international law.16
3. The Evolving Status of Map Evidence in U.S. Courts
Traditionally, American courts have seldom accepted maps as
conclusive evidence in resolving boundary disputes.162 This was similar to
the rule under traditional international law. 16 However, contemporary
American law of evidence has evolved to such a degree that it has become
impossible to overstate the importance of exhibits such as maps in modem
trials. 164 As long as they are properly authenticated as to accuracy,
reliability, completeness, and fairness, maps are generally admissible into
evidence to enable the court or the jury to visualize and better understand
and apply the evidence in the case. 165 Furthermore, the "ancient document"
rule enables an original map over thirty years old to be admissible to
evidence in proving the location of a boundary line.'
66
a. Traditional Status of Maps as Evidence
Historically, American courts ignored the evidentiary value of maps as
much as international tribunals did under traditional international law.167 A
classic example of this approach is the case of Melish's map, adopted in
Article III of the Treaty between the United States and Spain on the
boundary west of the Mississippi river.' 68 Article III provided, in part, that
the boundary should follow "the course of the Rio Roxo, westward, to the
159 BROWN, supra note 141, at 69.
'60 Id. at 70.
161 As explained supra Part 11, the traditional rule on map evidence in international law usually
rejected even official maps as evidence proving the existence or location of a boundary line.
162 See United States v. Texas, 162 U.S. 1, 36-38 (1895).




"67 Id. at 230.
168 Id.
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degree of longitude 100 west from London and 23 from Washington," and
concluded, "the whole being laid down in Melish's map of the United States
published at Philadelphia, improved to the first of January, 1818. '' 169 In fact,
it happened that the 100th meridian of longitude was located on Melish's
map more than one hundred miles further west than its correct astronomical
location. 170 The Supreme Court of the United States was called upon to
decide whether the contracting parties had intended to adopt the true
astronomical line or the line as laid down on Melish's map in United States v.
Texas. It held that it was the former.
171
One of the principal dangers inherent in the use of maps as evidence
lies in the fact that a layman may accept them as carrying greater weight
than documentary portrayal of the same facts. 172 The United States Supreme
Court held in this regard:
But it is said, the maps of the early explorers of the river and
the reports of travelers, prove the channel always to have been
east of the island. The answer to this is that evidence of this
character is mere hearsay as to facts within the memory of
witnesses, and if this consideration does not exclude all books
and maps since 1800, it certainly renders them of little value in
the determination of the question in dispute. If such evidence
differs from that of living witnesses, based on facts, the latter is
to be preferred. Can there be a doubt that it would be wrong in
principle, to dispossess a party of property on the mere
statements-not sworn to-of travelers and explorers, when
living witnesses, testifying under oath and subject to cross-
examination, and the physical facts of the case, contradict
them?'73
This shows that the traditional stance of U.S. courts towards map
evidence was very similar to that of international law. Because maps were
often copied from existing maps, courts accepted them only as ordinary
169 SANDIFER, supra note 3, at 230 (citing WILLIAM M. MALLOY, 2 TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS,
INTERNATIONAL ACTS, PROTOCOLS AND AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND
OTHER POWERS 1652 (1910)).
170 id.
171 United States v. Texas, 162 U.S. 1, 36-38 (1895).
172 SANDIFER, supra note 3, at 235-36.
173 Missouri v. Kentucky, 78 U.S. 395, 410 (1870).
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hearsay evidence. 174 The attitude of the courts, however, dramatically
changed in contemporary U.S. law.
b. The New Trend in the United States
Current U.S. law grants maps the same evidentiary value as other
documentary evidence. In fact, it has become impossible to overstate the
importance of maps in modem trials. 75 Demonstrative materials such as
maps are often essential to the successful outcome of litigation. 176 It is
important to see, therefore, what value map evidence has in contemporary
American courts, and whether the courts have laid a proper foundation for
establishing such value.
177
First, American courts accept today that, an original map, over thirty
years old, found in proper custody, authorized or recognized as an official
document, and free on its face of suspicion, is admissible in evidence as an
"ancient document" to prove the location of a boundary line.178 In addition,
as long as a map is properly authenticated as to accuracy, reliability, and
completeness, courts can admit it into evidence to enable the adjudicator to
visualize and better understand and apply the evidence in the case.
179
American courts use map evidence in several categories of cases: (1)
cases involving rights to and title in as well as uses of real property; (2)
cases involving the rights and liabilities of the owners and possessors of
tracts of land vis-A-vis persons on the land and neighboring landowners; and
(3) accident cases involving vehicles and pedestrians.'80
The first of these broad categories includes cases involving boundary
disputes, restrictive covenants, mining claims, oil and gas leases and rights,
181water and irrigation rights, eminent domain, and zoning. Maps of this
class may range in coverage from thousands of square miles-showing, for
example, the pattern of lumbering operations claimed to be unlawful or
contrary to a lease agreement-to disputed boundary claims at a particular
comer of two city lots. 182 Courts accord these types of maps great
174 SANDIFER, supra note 3, at 236.
175 44 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts § 707 (2004).
176 id.
177 Id.
178 Steele v. Fowler, 41 N.E. 2d 678, 683 (Ind. App. 1942).
179 id.
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evidentiary value. In fact, in some cases maps submitted by one party have
been reprinted in court reporters as integral parts of a court's opinion.
The second class of cases include those involving public and private
nuisances, lateral and subjacent support, land slippage, encroachments,
landowner's liability for conditions on his land to invitees, trespassers, and
attractive nuisances. 184 In these cases, courts allow maps to show conditions
on the land as well as the land's boundaries.18 5 In one case, plaintiffs
attorney used a map covering an area of many blocks to show that the route
taken by a young boy from his home to a particular destination took him on
a shortcut over defendant's property where he was injured, and that the path
was one in common use.'
8 6
Additionally, there are other kinds of cases in which maps receive
high deference. These are cases where maps portray jurisdiction to tax,
election contests, voting rights, and other boundaries of political
subdivisions. 187 For instance, a map that influenced the opinion of the
United States Supreme Court in Gomillion v. Lightfoot was reproduced in an
appendix to the decision. 188 It showed that the shape of a municipality had
been changed from a square to "an uncouth, 28-sided figure" in order to
exclude certain voters from the municipality. 
89
Finally, courts most commonly use maps in litigation growing out of
pedestrian and traffic accidents. 190 Here they may depict stretches of
highway hundreds of yards long, streets and intersections of lesser area, or
even just curb-lines and parts of streets and sidewalks.' 91 Such maps are
valuable in accurately reproducing the scenes where accidents took place,
lines of sight, stopping distances, and other important elements of the
landscape, and they often serve as bases for theories of liability.'
92
The emerging new rule will better conform to the GPL on map
evidence. The legal systems of Australia and the United States demonstrate
that domestic laws do not differentiate maps from other types of evidence.
Consequently, if the rule on map evidence in international law falls under
the rubric of GPL, instead of CIL, it would be natural for the rule to reflect
these domestic laws.
Is See Taylor v. Talmadge, 273 P.2d 506 (Wash. 1954) (overturned on other grounds).
'14 2 AM. JUR. Trials § 669 (1964).
185 id.
186 id.
117 44 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts § 707 (2004).
188 Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 348 (1960).
"9 Id. at 340.
190 44 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts § 707.
191 Id.
192 Id.
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IV. THE EMERGING RULE ON MAP EVIDENCE MAY HAVE IMPORTANT
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS ON TERRITORIAL DISPUTES IN THE PACIFIC
RIM REGION
No legal theory can solve all the territory or boundary disputes. Such
disputes are generally too vital to a state's national interests to yield just
because a legal rule, let alone a procedural one, has changed. However, it is
equally true that countries engaged in such disputes continuously try to
reinforce their legal positions by developing more evidence and invoking the
rules of international law to their own advantage. Thus, a change in
international law that would reinforce a party's position in a territorial
dispute may have the practical effect of providing greater incentives for the
involved countries to resolve the dispute.
A. A Map May Contribute to the Settlement of the Russo-Japanese
Dispute Over Southern Kurils/Northern Territories
The territorial dispute between Russia and Japan over the Southern
Kuril islands ("Southern Kurils") represents a dispute that the emerging rule
on map evidence can help resolve. 193 Although Russia is in actual
possession of these islands, an ancient Japanese map, Seiho-okuni-eze (or
Shoho-gokokuezu), may Support Japan's position that it has held the title
historically. Since Russia does not currently have the resources to
effectively develop these barren islands even if it had the intention, it would
be beneficial for both parties to develop them jointly.194 A firm international
rule that accords greater evidentiary value to maps could, along with other
factors, help Russia move towards this solution by strengthening the legal
claims of Japan.
Russia and Japan contested control of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands
for as long as the history of the islands is verifiable. 195 Japanese and Russian
193 The territorial dispute concerns four islands off the northeast coast of Hokkaido: Shikotan,
Kunashiri, Etorofu (or Iturup), and the Habomai group. Japan describes them as their Northern Territories,
while Russia calls them the Southern Kurils. The former Soviet Union occupied the disputed islands at the
end of World War II, and since then Japan has argued persistently for their return. Although Japan and
Russia have much to achieve by cooperating with each other, the Kurils issue has continued to strain the
Russo-Japanese relations. Valentin A. Povarchuk, The Unresolved Dispute Over the Northern
Territories/Southern Kurils and Russo-Japanese Relations 1-12 (1999) (unpublished Senior Honors Thesis,
Cornell University) (on file with author).
194 Id. at 2, 5-12.
195 Keith A. Call, Comment, Southern Kurils or Northern Territories? Resolving the Russo-Japanese
Border Dispute, 1992 BYU L. REv. 727, 729 (1992).
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writers disagree as to who was actually the first to discover and settle the
Kurils. 196 Although it is difficult to ascertain who was the first, it seems
reasonable to conclude that by the end of the eighteenth century, Russia had
closer ties with the northern Kurils, while Japan had closer ties with the
southern islands. 1
97
Japan's claim over the four islands is primarily based on its historical
title.1 98 It asserts that the Japanese explorers were the first to discover and
explore these islands. 199 According to Japan, Japanese merchants and
officials visited and traded with the Ainu, the indigenous people of the
Kurils, since the early seventeenth century, which is at least a century earlier
200than the arrival of the Russians. Japanese maps produced in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries depicted all of the Northern Territories
and Sakhalin as belonging to Japan.2°1 Japan also claims that even after the
Russians began to inhabit the Kurils, it prevented them from occupying the
disputed islands. 20 2 Japan bases its argument on the documents produced
before World War II, which show that Russian influence never extended
over the four disputed islands.20 3
Russia disputes, among other things, the Japanese version of the early
history of the islands. 204 Russia claims that it had developed all of the Kuril
Islands long before Japan had even claimed the island of Hokkaido as its
territory.20 5 According to Russia, Japanese claims are invalid because the
Kuril Ainu became Russian citizens between 1711 and 1738, and
sovereignty of the islands passed to Russia.20 6 Russia further asserts that in
the latter part of the eighteenth century only a small part of the southern
peninsula of Hokkaido was colonized by the Japanese.20
Both parties base their claims on the theory of occupation in addition
to other theories of legal title. 208 Occupation is a method of acquiring
196 Id.
"9 Id. at 730.
198 Amy B. Quillen, Comment, The "Kuril Islands" or the "Northern Territories"": Who Owns
Them? Island Territorial Dispute Continues to Hinder Relations Between Russia and Japan, 18 N.C. J.










208 Povarchuk, supra note 193, at 53-56.
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209
territory which belongs to no one (terra nullius) under certain conditions. 210
It must be effective and intended as a claim to sovereignty over the area. 1°
Historically, occupation has often been preceded by discovery, but mere
discovery was considered insufficient to constitute title to territory since the
seventeenth century.211 Acquiring territorial title required something more: a
212
symbolic act of taking possession.
Japan and Russia claim occupation of the disputed islands from the
seventeenth or eighteenth century. 213 According to the principle of
intertemporal law, only the rules valid at the time of the act can be applied in
international law.214 Although it is not clear whether the islands could be
regarded as terra nullius, there is merit for the occupation theory under
seventeenth century international law norms because the existence of
indigent people, the Ainu in this case, often did not bar claims for
occupation until the eighteenth or nineteenth century. 2 5 Mere discovery,
however, gives a nation only an inchoate title, an option to consolidate the
216title by fulfilling the elements of occupation. Maps may play a pivotal
role in this context by weighing in as evidence of jurisdictional or
217
administrative acts. For example, in the Rann of Kutch Arbitration or the
Arbitration between Colombia and Venezuela, maps were upheld as
evidence that a party exercised or recognized its jurisdiction over an area.
218
Further, in the Minquiers and Ecrehos case, Judge Levi Carneiro indicated
that maps can be used as evidence that a country's occupation has been
broadly recognized. 219 Finally, there is a strong argument that even "mere
realization or sighting" was considered to constitute legal title until the
220sixteenth century.
Should international law accord more evidentiary value to maps, it
could strengthen the Japanese claim of occupation of the disputed islands
because Japan can provide map evidence to support its claim. In 1644, the
209 SHAW, supra note i2, at 342.
210 id.
211 Id. at 343.
212 Id. The state or individuals whose actions are later ratified by their State must perform activities
that could establish the title. Id.
213 Povarchuk, supra note 193, at 37-41.
214 SHAW, supra note 12, at 34647.
215 ROBERT JENNINGS & ARTHUR WATrS, supra note 135, at 687 n.4.
216 BROWNLIE, supra note 24, at 144.
217 Id. at 157. Map evidence played such a role in the Indo-Pakistan Western Boundary (India v.
Pakistan), 17 R.I.A.A. 1, 535 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1968).
218 E. LAUTERPACHT, 50 INTERNATIONAL LAW REPORTS 176-77, 514-18.
219 Minquiers-Ecrehos (Fr. v. U.K.), 1953 I.C.J. 47, 105 (Nov. 17) (Separate Opinion of Judge
Cameiro).220 SHAW, supra note 12, at 343.
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Japanese lord Matsumae had already compiled and sent to the rulers of
Japan a map named Seiho-okuni-ezu (or Sh~ho-gokokuezu), a remarkable
proof that by that point he already considered the Kuril Islands to be a part
of his domain.221 The strengthened Japanese claim may help to encourage
the settlement of the dispute. Because certain bases for compromise already
exist,212 Russia and Japan may be able to resolve the issue in a mutually
beneficial way. Ideally, the two countries could combine forces for joint
development of the islands.
B. Maps May Also Aid in Resolution of the Korean-Japanese Dispute
Over Dokdo/Takeshima
The dispute between Japan and South Korea over the jurisdiction of
the island Dokdo/Takeshima is another good example of how an evolution
of the rule on map evidence could affect the outcome of a dispute. While
both Korea and Japan claim historical title over this small island, Korea is
currently in possession of the territory. Japan has urged Korea to refer the
matter to the ICJ, but Korea has made it clear that it has no intention of
doing so. 223 The historical maps, which constitute a large portion of the
224evidence of both sides, are generally more in favor of the Korean position.
Consequently, a clearer international law supporting the evidentiary value of
these maps could induce Korea into seeking an international adjudication of
the dispute.
The legal title over the small island of Dokdo (Takeshima in
Japanese), has been one of the most contentious issues between Japan and
South Korea for over half a century.2 25 Japan bases its claim over Dokdo
mainly on historic activities of the Japanese people in the seventeenth
221 Povarchuk, supra note 193, at 37.
22 Id. at 126.
13 SUN PYO Kim & HYUNG KI LEE, KOREA MARITIME INSTITUTE, REINFORCING THE LEGALITY OF
THE KOREAN JURISDICTION OVER DOKDO 133 (2001).
24 Id. at 174.
225 HEE KwON PARK, THE LAW OF THE SEA AND NORTHEAST ASIA: A CHALLENGE FOR COOPERATION
84 (2000). DokdotTakeshima is a rocky island located in the East Sea/Sea of Japan between Japan and
South Korea. Id. It consists of two main volcanic islets with approximately thirty two small rocks circling
them. While Korea currently has effective possession of the island, Japan has been claiming it since 1952.
The issue of sovereignty over these barren islets emerged as a major source of contention between South
Korea and Japan on January 18, 1952, when the Korean government included the area around Dokdo
within the Syngman Lee Line Zone-a Korean version of the fishery zone or the Exclusive Economic
Zone-under "the sovereignty and protection of the Republic of Korea." Id. Contesting the legitimacy of
the Zone itself, the Japanese government challenged Korea's territorial jurisdiction over the islet on the
ground that it had historically been part of Japan's territory. Id. at 85. The controversy was rekindled
recently, when the issue of delimiting the EEZ arose during the negotiations on revisions to the bilateral
fisheries agreement of 1965. Id.
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century. Alternatively, Japan argues the island was terra nullius until 1905,
when a Japanese prefecture annexed the island as part of 
its territory. 2 1
Japan has been urging Korea to refer the issue to the ICJ on this basis. South
Korea, on the other hand, consistently maintains that Dokdo has been part of
the Korean territory since the earliest historical times.
227 Korea states that it
is entitled under international law to sovereignty over the island, because it
established its historical title by peaceful and continuous possession.
228 As
both countries claim historical title over the island, historical documentary
evidence supporting each party's contentions becomes essential. A large
portion of such documentary evidence consists of historical maps.
229
Map evidence of title demonstrates that Korea has a stronger claim to
the island territory. 230 Historical maps, including some from Japanese
sources, show that Korea's connection with Dokdo has been stronger, easily
surpassing any historical ties of Japan.23' In addition to its own historical
maps,232 Korea can take advantage of a number of Japanese maps which
depict Dokdo as Korean territory. Japan, on the other hand, can only rely
on some of its own maps.2 34 This provides a significant advantage for Korea,
since international tribunals accord more credence to the maps produced by
a neutral party.235 If a map produced by a neutral party is deemed to be free
of any political bias,236 then a map produced by the party with adverse
interests may receive even greater deference. Therefore, maps might prove
to be a decisive factor to the outcome of the adjudication if Korea and Japan
refer their dispute to an international tribunal.
So far, the weak status of maps under traditional international law has
not provided any incentive for Korea to agree to an adjudication of this
matter. Consequently, the emerging rule on the use of map evidence, which
affords more evidentiary value to maps, may change this situation. If the
emerging rule becomes formally adopted by international tribunals, the
226 Id. at 85.
227 Id. at 84.
22 Id. at 85.
229 SuN PYo Kim & HYUNG KI LEE, supra note 223, at 133.
230 Benjamin K. Sibbett, Note, Dokdo or Takeshima? The Territorial Dispute between Japan and the
Republic of Korea, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1606, 1634-39 (1998).
23 HEE KWON PARK, supra note 225, at 88.
232 For example, 1678-1752 Tongguk-chido (Map of Korea), 1821-46 Chosun Chondo (Complete
Map of Korea), and 1822 Haejwa-chondo indicate the exact location of Dokdo as part of Korean territory.
Sibbett, supra note 230, at 1637.233 For example, 1785 Samguk Chubyang-do, Samguk Chong-do, and Chosun Paldo Chong-do
clearly mark Dokdo as Korean territory. SUN PYO KIM & HYUNG KI LEE, supra note 223, at 11-12.
4 Id. at 133.
235 Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554, 583, 586, paras. 56, 62 (Dec. 22).
236 Id. at 582-83, paras. 54-56.
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change may encourage Korea to settle the matter permanently by agreeing to
submit the dispute to international adjudication.
V. CONCLUSION
The traditional rule on map evidence in international law is
undergoing significant revisions. Many international decisions reveal that
international tribunals are willing to acknowledge the evidentiary value of
map evidence more than ever before. Although the tribunals do not yet
expressly condemn the traditional rule, one can observe a new trend in the
tribunals' recent decisions. It seems to be only a matter of time until the
tribunals openly acknowledge the transition in CIL and incorporate the new
rule.
The emerging rule on map evidence is a better reflection of GPL,
another source of international law. International law needs to take into
account common sense principles underlying rules of evidence in domestic
laws. An analysis on how domestic laws of certain countries deal with map
evidence demonstrates that there are good reasons for according greater
evidentiary value to maps in international law. The laws of Australia and
the United States provide us with insights into this issue. Domestic laws
generally give much more evidentiary value to map evidence than
international law.
The emerging rule on the use of map evidence in international
disputes may have very significant implications. Among such implications
is the ability to facilitate resolution of international territorial and boundary
disputes. Maps form a great part of the evidence in such disputes. Thus, the
transition to a new rule that affords maps more evidentiary value may turn
out to be a decisive factor in inducing adjudication or settlement of
international conflicts. The territory/boundary disputes between Japan and
Russia and Japan and South Korea illustrate this point.
237 Although possession is said to be nine-tenths of the law, countries often seek judgments of
international tribunals regarding their territorial disputes "not as ends in themselves but rather as elements
in a much broader strategy for the resolution of the crises of which the disputes formed but a small part."
JOHN COLLIER & VAUGHAN LOWE, THE SETrLEMENT OF DISPUTES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: INSTITUTIONS
AND PROCEDURES 9 (1999). Numerous examples show us that territorial disputes almost always have the
potential of progressing into strategic crises. Jin-Soo Bae, Analysis ofDokdo's Military Crisis Possibility,
2 STRATEGY 21, 69 (1998). Further, "[ijnternational tribunals can be an expedient way of breaking a
negotiating impasse in situations where a government's freedom to negotiate is constrained by domestic
considerations." COLLIER& LOWE, supra.
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